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If you're a finance leader inside a PE-backed portfolio company, you already know the drill: tighter timelines, higher reporting expectations, and a board that wants to see the value creation plan before the ink on the deal dries.
Abacum just published Private Equity in the AI Age - a field guide written for CFOs navigating post-deal pressure, roll-up complexity, and the 100-day sprint. It covers how AI-enabled businesses are commanding higher multiples, what PE firms now expect from PortCo finance teams, and how to structure capital, debt, and treasury decisions amid accelerating deal velocity. This isn't a trend report. It's the playbook I wish I'd had.

Why Do Liquidation Preferences Exist?
The majority of startups don’t work out. That means companies may exit for a value less than the amount of cash they raised.
The data is a little old, but Carta crunched the numbers and saw that 254 startups on the platform closed down in Q1 of 2024, more than any other quarter to date, and 58% higher than the prior year period.

Source: Carta
With only 20% to 30% of companies who raised a Seed round making it to Series A (Source: Dealroom), liquidation preferences serve as downside protection for investors if the company exits for less than what was initially expected. And it also means the investors get out before the common shareholders (employees + founders).
Liquidation Features
In exchange for downside protection, investors pay a premium for preferred shares, which may have one of the following features:
1) Multiple of Invested Capital
This is most relevant when the outcome is below the amount of capital put in. It states how many times over the investor gets their initial investment back before any of the common shareholders get a bite (assuming there’s even enough to get to that total minimum threshold).
Example:
Company sells for $80M, and there’s $10M invested in Preferred shares with a 2x Multiple. The Preferred represent 20% ownership (common holds the remaining 80%)
The preferred shareholders get a 2x return on their initial investment:
2 x $10M = $20M
After paying the liquidation preference, the remaining proceeds are $60M ($80M - $20M). The common shareholders split this up.
However, let’s say it’s a true downside situation - if the company sold for only $15M, all $15M would go to the investor, and none would be left for common
You must apply any Multiples (and in the correct order, based on share class seniority, if it exists) before you proceed to check the Participating feature (see below)
2) Participating Preferred
This takes Multiple to the next level. It’s relevant when the outcome is above the amount of capital put in (i.e., “the pref stack”).
Participating liquidation preferences, also known as “participating preferred” or "fully participating preferred," allow investors to recoup their initial investment first, and ALSO share in the remaining proceeds like everyone else.
It’s essentially double dipping into the proceeds; first investors get a bite off the top, and then they hop back in line for more.

Example:
Company sells for $100M, and there’s $10M invested in Preferred shares with a 1x Multiple. They represent 20% ownership (common holds the remaining 80%)
The investors take their $10M off the top first, so the remaining proceeds are $90M ($100M - $10M)
They also participate in the remaining proceeds as if they held common
Preferred shareholders get 20% of $90M = $18M
Common shareholders get 80% of $90M = $72M
So if we add it all up, the Participating Preferred shareholders got a total of $28M ($10M off the top + $18M in participating) of the $100M in proceeds, representing 28%, or +8% more than their fully diluted ownership on paper
3) Capped
Capped participating preferred shares put a cap on the total amount preferred shareholders can receive, which benefits the entrepreneur and employees by limiting the investor’s upside. This is less common, but rumor has it that OpenAI had this feature before converting to a real corporation.
Example:
Company sells for $100M, and there’s $10M invested in Preferred shares with a 2x liquidation preference multiple representing 20% ownership with a 3x cap (the common hold the remaining 80%)
The preferred shareholders get their initial investment back first, of $20M (2 x $10M)
After paying the liquidation preference, the remaining proceeds are $80M ($100M - $20M).
Preferred shareholders then participate in the remaining proceeds as if they held common shares.
So initial math says they would get 20% of $80M = $16M.
However, their total payout (including the liquidation preference) is capped at 3x their original investment.
$20M in Multiple + $16M in participating = $36M
Since they already received $20M, they can receive up to an additional $10M from the remaining proceeds, for $30M total, or 3x
The remaining $70M goes to common shareholders, preserving $6M
The Liquidation Stack
Let’s take this liquidation stuff to the next level. There are three types of seniority structures that determine which class of shares get paid out first (Source: Fidelity):
Standard. Later stage investors receive their liquidation preference first (e.g. D, C, B, then A). So it goes in reverse order.
Pari passu. All investors receive their liquidation preference at the same time. This is a fancy Latin (French? IDK) word for “equal footing”. It’s the cleanest, simplest structure.
Tiered. Classes are grouped together (e.g. F and E, D and C, B and A). Then, the tiers receive their liquidation preference in standard order. And within each tier, classes receive payouts in a pari passu manner. So it’s kind of a combination of both above.
There are some dependent decisions here, as you might have sniffed out, especially when investors are non-participating and deciding whether they want to convert or not.
Therefore, decisions will always start in order of investors with the highest conversion point (typically at the latest stage) to the lowest conversion point. This ensures that conversion decisions are optimal for all parties (Source: Next Big Teng).
What about the me?

Wow, I almost forgot about all the commoners waiting for soup. They get to participate once the boxes are checked for everyone holding preferred shares.
This is why common shares typically trade for less on the secondary market - not only do they come with fewer rights to impact company direction, since they are in the back of the bus when it comes to voting power, they also have the least amount of downside protection.
If you want to be first in line, you’ve got to pay for that insurance policy.
When do liquidation preferences NOT matter?
Upon IPO. At that point, almost always, all shares convert to common. That’s why there are so many late stage employees rooting for their companies to limp to the IPO finish line and just go public. It would ensure, even if it’s a lower valuation than their last round, that they get a fair shot at whatever proceeds are up for grabs, as everyone converts to common shares.
This is preferable to going through an M&A process where the preference stack kicks in and chews up most of the value, leaving the employees with whatever crumbs are left.
And to state the obvious, when you sell for more than your last valuation (assuming 1x liquidation preferred), a lot of this stuff doesn’t matter and everyone gets to high five.
Oh, I forgot
Debt always gets paid back first. They’re in front of everyone, including preferred.
So yea, subtract any debt repayments out. The SVBs and other venture debt lenders of the world are the rock to equity holder scissors.
What does this mean for startup employees?
You should know how much money your company has raised. While raising money de-risks the future to a certain extent, and buys you oxygen to survive longer while burning cash, it also cuts into your potential payback. For each dollar you raise, you build that wall a little higher.

For example, if you are working at a tech company that’s raised $500M to date, and the valuation sinks from $4B to $2B, that means upon an M&A event there would only be $1.5B to go around after your preference stack is paid back (or maybe even less, if there are also some participating preferred provisions in there).
So whatever rough math you were doing in your head of “I own this % applied to that valuation” takes a steep discount.
That’s also why it’s so important for founders to take clean term sheets, even if it means accepting a lower valuation. Post COVID, many startups took, to use a less offensive word, “structured” term sheets that allowed them to artificially preserve their latest valuation (read: save face). Guaranteed multiples, in particular, can be a death sentence.

In reality, the headline valuation was all smoke and mirrors - the common shares are worth less than they were before on a risk adjusted basis. Said another way, the company’s risk has been reallocated disproportionally.
Big valuations don’t directly translate to your pocket as a common shareholder.
A word on perverse incentives
What takes this from three to four dimensional chess is when you take into account the lifecycle of the fund which your investors made commitments from. Depending on the fund’s age and performance to date, here are five random and hypothetical scenarios to illustrate how there are times when investors are making decisions based more on their own specific scenarios, and less so your company’s:
Not Care:
If they already knocked it out of the park on another investment and you won’t move the needle (think if you were in the same Benchmark fund that invested in Uber)
Push to Sell:
If all their other investments in the fund have been mediocre and this will get them over the IRR hurdle so they can start receiving carry (more common in late stage leveraged buyout funds than early stage venture)
If they need to return money to LPs so those LPs can recycle that money back into a new fund the investors are raising
Push to Hold
If they were the last investors in, and have barely had time to put their money to work, which would force them to find another company to put the same cash into…
If they are at the end of the fund’s life and want to continue milking management fees
And the more “structure” you have in your preference stack, the more complicated the scenarios I outlined above become.
Finally, while investors who have structured protection love it, those same terms are a red flag to future investors who realize they’ll be disadvantaged (unless they also slap some provisions on).
Founders should be wary of taking dirty term sheets not only because it makes the liquidation process worse for others on the cap table, but also because it could preclude them from raising future rounds.
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